

Course: GV251

Class teacher: Kira Gartzou-Katsouyanni

## **LT Week 10: Foreign policy**

**PART I) EU foreign policy – an overview**

**(a) What are the different elements of EU foreign policy?**




**(b) Why did the EU acquire competence to act in each of the aforementioned areas of foreign policy?**

Empty rectangular box for answer to question (b).

**(c) What are the barriers to achieving a consistent EU foreign policy, and how do they vary across the different areas of EU foreign policy?**

Empty rectangular box for answer to question (c).

**EU actors involved in foreign policy**



**(d) Why don't the member-states further simplify the EU's institutional architecture in order to facilitate consistency in the EU's foreign policy?**

**(e) What is meant by the term "civilian power"? How accurately does this term characterise the EU as a foreign policy actor? Should the EU aspire to be a civilian power?**

## **PART II) EU foreign policy and crisis containment – two case studies**

Please consider the cases of the EU's response to the breakdown of Yugoslavia and the Arab Spring, as well as other examples from your general knowledge of international relations, and answer the following questions:

- (a) How effectively has the EU managed to contain crises in its neighbourhood in the past? What factors limit the EU's ability to respond to crises in an effective way?**
- (b) If you were an EU decision-maker, what policies would you recommend to enable the EU to respond to crises in a more effective way in the future?**

**Note:** While the aim of this exercise is to consider some of the limitations in the EU's capacity to manage complex and multifaceted crises in its neighbourhood in an effective way, it is important to also keep in mind that particularly since the launch of the European Security and Defense Policy in 1999, the EU has also had important successes in containing other crises in its neighbourhood. For example, the EU played a crucial role in de-escalating conflict in Macedonia in 2001. Beyond crisis management, it should not be forgotten that the EU is a powerful international actor when it comes to trade negotiations, and has also had some important diplomatic successes, such as the role it played in the negotiation of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.

### Case 1: The EU's response to the breakdown of Yugoslavia

In order to gain some information about the wars that followed the breakdown of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, we will watch excerpts from the BBC's 1995 six-part documentary on "The Death of Yugoslavia". The documentary is a rich resource that includes a lot of detailed primary material, such as interviews with the key actors involved.

We will watch two excerpts of the documentary in class. The first one is about the **peace plan proposed by the EC envoy Lord Carrington in March 1992**, which ultimately failed to prevent war from breaking out in Bosnia (excerpt from episode 3: "Wars of Independence"). The second excerpt refers to the way in which **a durable peace deal was finally brokered at Dayton, Ohio in 1995**, following the bombing of Bosnian Serb targets by an American-led NATO force (excerpt from episode 6: "Pax Americana").

Episode 3: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6zTmgxW490>

Episode 6: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bLrlaZSGXyA>

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### Case 2: The EU's Neighbourhood Policy and the Arab Spring

The second case has to do with the EU's policy towards the countries of North Africa, both before and after the Arab Spring.

Since 2003, the **European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)** has been the cornerstone of the EU's policy towards the North African countries. The ENP was a new instrument adopted by the EU in 2003-4 to structure relations with neighbouring countries to the South and East of the EU. A key element of ENP is **the disbursement of aid to neighbouring states, in exchange for economic liberalisation, political reforms, and security cooperation**. The ENP continues to constitute a core part of the EU's policy towards its neighbours. Indeed, spending for the ENP represents 24% of expenditure for the EU's external action during the 2014-2020 budget period.

The ENP's predecessor as far as Europe's southern neighbours were concerned was the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (**EMP**), which was launched at the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Conference convened by the Spanish Presidency of the EU in Barcelona. The foremost dimension of the EMP had also been economic.

In order to spark the discussion, I have shared a few excerpts from two academic articles on the effectiveness of EU policies towards North Africa. The first article focuses on EU policies before the Arab Spring, while the second one focuses on the post-Arab Spring period.

Excerpts from: Rosemary Hollis (2012). "No friend of democratization: Europe's role in the genesis of the 'Arab Spring'". The Royal Institute of International Affairs 88.1, p. 81-94.

"The **kinds of formulae for enhancing economic growth pursued under the EMP** were more likely to promote efficiency measures that actually cut jobs, at least in the short term, as opposed to generating them. Meanwhile, without reforms in the educational sector there was a mismatch between the jobs on offer and the skills of the available labour force. At the same time, the elite strata of society in the Arab states proved able to adapt to market liberalization and negotiate new monopoly deals that perpetuated their privileged status and comparative wealth." (p. 84)

"All the EU initiatives and bilateral agreements with Arab and other neighbouring states have included **commitments to cooperate on border controls and in combatting terrorism**. Under the ENP, the implementation of specific measures for migration control is among the conditions to be met by the Mediterranean Partner Countries in order to receive more EU financial assistance. (...) In fulfillment of the EU's security agenda, deals were made with the very dictatorial regimes that have come under pressure from their populations in the Arab Spring. (...) The EU allowed Arab governments to avoid implementing any serious political reforms in the interests of ensuring their cooperation on security and intelligence-sharing." (p. 92-93)

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Excerpts from: Federica Bicchì (2014). "The politics of foreign aid and the European Neighbourhood Policy post-Arab Spring: 'More for more' or less of the same?" Mediterranean Politics 19.3, p. 318-332.

"The institutional practice of EU foreign policy post-Arab uprisings has been characterized by a **high number of actors with a low level of political power**. (...) While the EEAS is in charge of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Commission retains responsibility for External Economic Relations and, most importantly, for all the financial instruments the EU has for foreign affairs. (...) [The declarations issued in response to the Arab spring] came from the full set of actors: member states separately, the EU Council, the European Council, HR/ VP Ashton, the Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Füle, the President of the European Parliament and the President of the European Commission, to name but a few. While all these actors technically have a right to express their views on foreign affairs, it was often unclear who was in fact speaking for the whole of Europe. (p. 320-321)

"The Europeans' response to the post-Arab Spring context has been in line with the previous decades, reflecting the same priorities that have characterized European foreign policy for at least two decades. The Communications issued by the EU in 2011, often summarized with the motto '**more for more**', have not altered practice dating from pre-Arab Spring times. (...) The main EU tools remain **trade and limited aid, coupled with conditionality**. Conditionality is the traditional EU instrument for linking trade and aid to political developments. (...) [For example,] sustainable economic development, which is currently taken as a synonym of equitable development, remains a challenge more than a policy. **The EU has consistently relied on the mantra that economic liberalization would contribute to political liberalization**. However, there is increasing evidence that political elites, e.g. in Morocco and in Egypt, have managed to benefit from EU-induced privatizations and affect political developments, *a contrario*, by exacerbating social tensions." (p. 322-324)